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COMMENTS

Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration:
An Impotent Approach to the Punishment of
Sex Offenders
INTRODUCTION

The use of castration as a punitive measure, practiced for centuries by
other cultures, has enjoyed newfound prominence in this country's criminal
justice system as a potential remedy for the proliferation of sex offenses.
Not surprisingly, the implementation of castration as an alternative to
incarceration has generated considerable debate, including questions
regarding its constitutionality and desirability from a public policy
standpoint. Fueling the controversy, several recently convicted sex offenders
have requested that they be castrated rather than receive lengthy prison
sentences.
In March of 1992, Steven Allen Butler, a convicted rapist, stood before
Texas District Court Judge Michael McSpadden and requested that the judge
order surgical castration rather than sentencing him to prison.' Judge
McSpadden initially assented to the request, but ultimately withdrew
approval in the wake of national publicity and protests by civil libertarians.2
Physicians in the area refused to perform the operation, and even Butler
found himself reconsidering his unusual request.3
In Great Britain, a man with a forty-year history of child sex abuse
privately arranged for his own surgical castration 4 after prison authorities
ignored his repeated pleas for the operation. 5 The subject, a sixty year old
1. Douglas J. Besharov & Andrew Vachhs, Sex Offenders:

Acceptable Punishment?, 78 A.B.A. J. 42, 42 (July 1992).

Is Castration an

2. Id.
3. Id.

4. See Jennifer Nadel, Castration Was My Cure, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), July

24, 1994, at 12. Russell Reid, a consultant psychiatrist specializing in the treatment of
transexuals, supported the offender's pursuit of surgical castration and arranged for the
operation to be conducted at the offender's expense. Id.
5. Id. See also Victoria MacDonald, Castration My Only Salvation Says Sex Pest,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 26, 1993, at 4. The offender's request and subsequent
surgery generated a great deal of press in Great Britain and has served as the subject of a
number of BBC broadcasts and newspaper articles. The offender, known as "Tom," initiated
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former coal miner, has served numerous prison terms for sex offenses
against children and has threatened suicide, gone on hunger strikes and even
attempted to castrate himself.6 Although officials at a psychiatric hospital
offered to administer chemical castration, the offender refused such
treatment, considering chemical castration a temporary, and therefore
inadequate, solution to his deviant behavior.7
Sharing this desire for sterilization, a thirty-eight year old convicted
rapist sentenced in McLean County, Illinois, expressed a preference for
castration rather than a prison sentence Despite the offender's request for
sterilization, the sentencing judge concluded that castration was not a viable
alternative to incarceration and sentenced the repeat offender to a thirtyseven year term of imprisonment. 9
This comment addresses the legal implications of castration as a
punitive measure, tracing the development of compulsory sterilization from
its origins in the eugenics movement in the early twentieth century to its
present status as an alternative to imprisonment. In particular, the first
section explores the rise of eugenics legislation in the United States, the
Supreme Court's legitimization of compulsory sterilization and the current
practice among the courts of upholding sterilization legislation for the
mentally retarded. Within the second section, the use of castration as a
punitive measure both in the United States and abroad is discussed. In
addition, the second section describes methods of male sterilization,
including surgical castration, vasectomy and the non-surgical alternative,
chemical castration. ° The third section analyzes common constitutional
challenges to compulsory castration and asserts that the use of castration as
an alternative to incarceration violates the rights of privacy and procreation,
a six-year campaign for the operation after a prison officer showed him a magazine article
about castration. Id.
.6. Id. See also Chris Mihill, Sex Offender Seeks Surgical Castration, GUARDIAN
(Manchester, England), Sept. 24, 1993.
7. See Nadel, supra note 4, at 12. The offender argued that chemical castration
"would have been like growing a beard to hide a spot," emphasizing that he would "still be
a child molester; [he] would just be a child molester who was taking tablets." Id.
8. Judge Denies Man's Request to be Castrated,PEORIA J. STAR, Dec. 21, 1993, at
C5. Denying that his request was intended as a publicity stunt, the defendant, Jerry Palmer,
maintained that "if the court would consider castration, everyone would be better off." Id.
9. Id. Palmer was sentenced to the lengthy prison term following his conviction on
two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault for fondling two young girls. Id. His
criminal record also included a conviction for the rape of a young girl in 1982, as well as
burglary, theft and escape convictions. Id.
10. Each of the male sterilization methods receives separate discussion in the second
section; however, for purposes of this paper, vasectomy will be included in the general
category of surgical castration.

1994:107)

CASTRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION

and may also violate the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment. In the fourth section, the reasonable relationship test
is applied to castration as a term of probation, yielding mixed results. The
informed consent objection presented in the fifth section suggests that
castration as an alternative to a prison sentence violates the voluntariness
requirement of the informed consent doctrine. Finally, section six explores
the economic and social policy considerations implicated by sterilization in
the punitive context, focusing on the financial burdens to society and the
failure of castration to address the uncontrollable hostility manifesting itself
in acts of sexual violence. The article concludes by asserting that castration
in any form constitutes an ineffective, unconstitutional alternative to
incarceration.
I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK:

EUGENICS AND THE SOCIALLY UNFIT

Compulsory sterilization is not a novel concept. The controversy over
a court's or state agency's authority to destroy an individual's ability to
procreate has persisted for over a century, since the notion of involuntary
sterilization originated with the eugenics movement."
Defined by its
creator, Sir Francis Galton, as "the science which deals with all influences
that improve the unborn qualities of the race . . . [and] develop them to the
utmost advantage," eugenics seeks to achieve the elimination of social ills
through biological reformation. 2
American eugenicists relied upon
Darwin's theory of evolution 3 . and Mendel's genetics experimentation"
11. See generally ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949)
(discussing the history of the eugenics movement).
12. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1420 (1981). The socially unfit constituted a diverse group
comprised of the feeble-minded, insane, criminalistic, epileptic, inebriate, diseased, blind,
deaf, deformed and dependent. Id. at 1428.
13. A cousin to Francis Galton, Charles Darwin conceived notions of natural selection
and survival of the fittest which had a tremendous impact on both scientific and social
thought. Darwin posited that the environment selected those genes that would be passed on
to future generations and those that would be removed from the gene pool, such that only
those organisms carrying the superior genes would survive. See generally CHARLES DARWIN,
THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (6th ed. 1899).
14. Gregor Mendel, an Austrian monk who experimented by crossbreeding peas in the
1860s, found that organisms inherited traits from pairs of determiners (genes) contributed by
each parent. See Cynkar, supra note 12, at 1421. Mendel classified determiners as dominant
or recessive according to the appearance of the inherited trait in the new organism and
developed a ratio for calculating the probability that a given trait would appear in future
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to provide scientific support for their movement.' 5 Borrowing from the
research of Darwin and Mendel, eugenicists theorized that feeble-mindedness
and other negative qualities resulted from inferior genes.' 6 Operating on
this premise, proponents of eugenics linked every existing social problem to
heredity and concluded that the solution to the country's social ills required
control over human reproduction.' 7 Through lecture tours and written
propaganda, positive eugenics encouraged individuals with superior genes
to select mates from within their own ranks and to maximize family size.' 8
Negative eugenics utilized a different approach, calling for the implementation of a program of sterilization to eliminate procreation of the unfit.' 9
Before 1900, compulsory sterilization of the unfit enjoyed limited popular
support.2

Surgical castration, that era's prevailing method of sterilization,

produced hormonal imbalance and psychological and physiological
effects.2 ' With the emergence of two less severe methods, vasectomy 22
and4 salpingectomy, 23 compulsory eugenics sterilization grew in populari2
ty.

generations. Id. Eugenicists believed that similar ratios could be used to predict the inheritability of physical and psychological traits in humans. Id.
15. Richard A. Estacio, Comment, Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled in
Pennsylvania: Three Generations Without Legislative Guidance are Enough, 92 DICK. L.
REV.

409, 412 (1988).

16. Cynkar, supra note 12, at 1421-22.
17. Id. at 1423. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL.
L. REV. 1945, 1961 (1993) (discussing the historical role of eugenics sterilization as a
remedy for crime and poverty in America).
18. Cynkar, supra note 12. at 1428.
19. Estacio, supra note 15, at 411. According to one proponent of negative eugenics,
the "surest, the simplest, the kindest, and most humane means for preventing reproduction
among those whom we deem unworthy of the high privilege, is a gentle, painless death." M.
HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 42 (1963) (cited in
Cynkar, supra note 12. at 1429).
20. Cynkar, supra note 12, at 1429.
21. Id.
22. A vasectomy entails the surgical excision of a portion of the ductus (vas) deferens
to induce infertility. CAMPBELL'S UROLOGY 2963 (5th ed., 1986).
23. Salpingectomy refers to the surgical removal of the uterine tube. SLOANEDORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 625 (1987).
24. Cynkar, supra note 12, at 1429-30. Due to the procedure's adverse physiological
effects, advocates of surgical castration were forced to find some therapeutic or punitive
value in the operation in order to defend its use. Id. at 1429. However, once sterilization
could be achieved through comparatively minor surgery in the form of a salpingectomy or
vasectomy, eugenicists no longer found it necessary to invoke therapeutic or punitive
rationales and could support the practice for purely eugenic reasons. Id. at 1429-30.
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B. COMPULSORY STERILIZATION LEGISLATION

Inspired by the eugenics rationale that played on the pervasive fear of
a growing mentally retarded citizenry, in the early 1900's, a number of
states enacted compulsory sterilization legislation.25 State laws mandated
sterilization for punitive and therapeutic purposes, with surgical procedures
such as castration," vasectomies27 and salpingectomies 2s performed to
punish convicted felons and rehabilitate mentally retarded individuals in
state institutions.29 State officials invoked the doctrine of parenspatriae30
to justify the involuntary sterilization of the mentally retarded, claiming to
act in the best interests of the institutionalized individuals. Under the
doctrine of parens patriae, the state bears the responsibility of caring for
citizens incapable of protecting their own interests.3 1 Despite legislators'
efforts to legitimize the practice of involuntary sterilization through reliance
on the parens patriae justification, the courts nevertheless established a
pattern of invalidating compulsory sterilization laws as violations of equal
protection or due process.32

25. Most states subsequently repealed such statutes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-531
to -554 (repealed 1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 99-1301 to -1319 (repealed 1970); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-13-13-1 to -16-4 (Burns) (repealed 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.381 to .392
(Callaghan) (repealed 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 38-601 to -608 (repealed 1969);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-501 to -508 (repealed 1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 174.1 to .14
(repealed 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-08-01 to -15 (repealed 1965); S.D.CoDIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 27-17 (repealed 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1 to -13 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 3201-04 (repealed 1967). But cf MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (Supp. 1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 35-36 (1984) (authorizing compulsory sterilization of the mentally
retarded).
26. Surgical castration is the removal of the testicles to produce infertility. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 234 (5th ed., 1982).
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29. Cynkar, supra note 12, at 1433-34.
30. Literally, "parent of the country," originating from English common law where the
King had the authority to act as the guardian for disabled persons. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
31. See Sandra Coleman, Involuntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded: Blessing
or Burden? 25 S.D. L. REV. 55, 62 n.56 (1980).
32. See In re Hendrickson, 123 P.2d 322 (Wash. 1942) (invalidating statute on basis
of due process violation); Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921) (invalidating statute as
due process violation); Haynes v. Lapeer, 166 N.W. 938 (Mich. 1918) (invalidating statute
on basis of equal protection violation); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978)
(invalidating statute on basis of equal protection violation).
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33
.": BUCK V. BELL AND THE AFTERMATH

At the height of the United States eugenics movement, proponents
found an unlikely ally in the nation's highest court. In the now famous case
of an institutionalized sixteen year old girl facing compulsory sterilization
pursuant to a Virginia statute,' the Court upheld the legislation as a valid
35 Writing for the majority, Justice
exercise of the state's police power.
Holmes rezsoned that it would be "better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
36
Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
continuing their kind ....
In Buck v. Bell, the Court concluded that the procedural safeguards in
sterilization decision-making 37 provided for by the statute satisfied procedural due process requirements, and further, that no equal protection
guarantees were violated because the statute applied uniformly to all feebleminded patients in state institutions. 3 In rejecting Ms. Buck's substantive
due process argument based on the constitutional interest in bodily
integrity,3 9 Justice Holmes observed that since a state may require its best
citizens to sacrifice their lives for the public welfare, "[ilt would be strange
if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order

33. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
34. 1924 VA. AcTs ch. 394 (1924).
35. 274 U.S. at 207.
36. Id. at 207. Holmes may have erred by referring to Carrie Buck, Carrie's mother
and Carrie's daughter as three generations of imbeciles. Carrie's daughter, originally
diagnosed mentally retarded by a Red Cross nurse, had not only completed the second grade
by the time she died from pneumonia, but had also been characterized as a bright child. See
Coleman, supra note 31, at 57 n.21.
37. 274 U.S. at 206-07. According to the Court, once the superintendent of an
institution concluded that it would be in the best interest of society and the patient to sterilize
the patient, the superintendent was required to present a petition to that effect before the
institution's board of directors. Id. at 206. Notice of the petition and impending hearing were
served upon the patient and his or her parents or guardian in the case of minor patients. Id.
Following the hearing before the board, the patient could appeal the board's order to the
circuit court and proceed with appeals to the Supreme Court of Appeals if necessary. Id. at
206-07.
38. Id. at 207-08.
39. I.P. Whitehead, Ms. Buck's attorney, based the bodily integrity argument on the
dissent in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting), in which Justice Field
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting citizens from "[the deprivation not only
of life, but of whatever God has given to everyone with life .... " Id. at 142.
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to prevent our being swamped with incompetence." 40 By upholding the
Virginia statute and offering judicial support for eugenics sterilization
legislation, the Court, in effect, legitimized the practice of involuntary
sterilization.
Buck v. Bell, although never expressly overruled, remains the subject
of widespread criticism and debate. Critics attack the eagerness with which
the Court consented to the deprivation of individual rights inthe name of
social progress."' Despite the criticisms of Buck v. Bell, courts have
continued to uphold sterilization legislation for the mentally retarded when
such sterilization is performed in the individual's best interests.4 2 Yet because some states have provided no clear guidelines to aid a court in the
determination of the best interests of an individual, the decision often
becomes a subjective conclusion left to the discretion of each court.43
II. CASTRATION AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE
While the involuntary sterilization of mentally retarded persons remains
a prominent issue, the greatest and most recent controversy regarding
40. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Butler dissented without a written
opinion, and no concurring opinions were issued. See Cynkar, supra note 12, at 1450.
41. Estacio, supra note 15, at 416. Some commentators have compared United States
eugenics legislation with the sterilization practices Hitler instituted in Nazi Germany. See,
e.g., Ruth Hubbard, Eugenics: New Tools, Old Ideas, 13 WOMEN & HEALTH 225, 232
(1988).
42. See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1980) (ruling that the doctrine of parens
patriae justified the sterilization of a non-institutionalized, incompetent eighteen year old
woman); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635 (Wash. 1980) (concluding that the
sterilization of a mentally retarded minor was encompassed within the state's parens patriae
authority); In re Sallmaier, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (asserting parens patriae
authority in ordering the sterilization of a twenty-three year old, brain-damaged woman to
protect her from a possible psychotic reaction to pregnancy).
43. For instance, to determine whether sterilization would be in the best interest of an
incompetent individual, the Vermont legislature requires state courts to consider the following
factors:
(A) that the respondent is physically capable of conceiving a child;
(B) that the respondent is likely to engage in sexual activity at present or
in the near future under circumstances which may result in pregnancy;
(C) that the nature of the respondent's disability renders the respondent
incapable now or in the future of caring for a child;
(D) that the respondent's disability is not likely to improve, nor does
medical knowledge exist to establish that an advance in treatment of the disability
is likely;
(E) that no effective, less drastic alternative to sterilization is medically
indicated which will meet the needs of the respondent.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 8711(3) (1992).
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44
procreative rights has arisen in the punitive context. As an alternative to
imprisonment, male sex offenders may elect to undergo castration as
punishment for their crimes, raising a number of legal, social and moral
issues.

A. CASTRATION AS PUNISHMENT FOR SEX OFFENDERS:
ABROAD

THE U.S. AND

Throughout history, cultures outside the United States have practiced
compulsory castration as a means of punishing men convicted of sex
offenses.45 Several European countries provide for sterilization of sex
offenders by statute.46 In the early 1900s, states in this country enacted
legislation requiring the surgical castration of sex offenders and convicted
felons. Upon constitutional challenge, however, such statutes were struck
47
down as violations of the mandate against cruel and unusual punishment.
In 1985, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected castration as an
recent
44. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text for a summary of several
rather than
castrated
be
to
offenders
sex
convicted
by
requests
regarding
controversies
sentenced to prison.
45. Nickolaus Heim & Carolyn J. Hursch, Castration for Sex Offenders: Treatment
BEHAV.
or Punishment? A Review of Recent European Literature, 8 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
castration
legalize
to
country
European
first
the
became
Denmark
1929,
In
(1979).
281, 282
Sweden
as a medical treatment. Id. Germany, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia and
Id.
quickly followed suit with their own castration legislation.
to
46. Id. In the contemporary western world, castration of sex offenders is confined
Switzerland.
and
Sweden
Norway,
Germany,
Denmark,
five western European countries:
William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders: Statutory
German
and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 3 (1986). The most recent
contexts:
statute, for example, permits castration in the following
(1) [lf the treatment is indicated according to the knowledge of medical
to
science prevent, cure, or ease serious diseases, mental disorders, or complaints
of the subject that result from his abnormal sexual drive, or
(2) if, because of the subject's abnormal sexual drive, his character, and
his previous manner of living, it may be assumed that he will commit further
sexual offenses, again given that castration is indicated according to the knowledge
of medical science to meet this risk, and that it is thus possible to help the person
with regard to his future way of life. Whether the operation will be effected or not
depends on the vote of an independent commission of experts. People who
because of insanity are unable to understand the whole procedure and the meaning
of the operation must be represented by a guardian.
Heim & Hursch, supra note 45, at 282.
47. See, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (characterizing vasectomy
216 F. 413
as degrading and cruel when imposed as punishment); see also Davis v. Berry,
those
including
convictions,
second
all
for
castration
compulsory
(holding
1914)
Iowa
(S.D.
crimes formerly misdemeanors, inherently cruel and unusual).
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alternative to a lengthy prison sentence for defendants convicted of a brutal
gang rape.48 Acknowledging that a trial judge has wide discretion in
imposing conditions of probation,4 9 the court nonetheless held that the
decision to impose castration as a term of probation constituted an abuse of
discretion where it subjected the defendants to cruel and unusual punishment.5 ° In reaching its decision, the court in Brown characterized castration as a form of mutilation prohibited by the Constitution."'
Although male sterilization both abroad and in the United States has
historically been accomplished by surgical castration or a vasectomy, 2
developments in pharmacology have created a chemical alternative to
surgical castration. 3 Like its surgical equivalents, chemical castration
remains susceptible to constitutional challenges. To provide a better
understanding of the implications of castration on offenders' constitutional
rights, the following section explains the two traditional methods of male
sterilization and discusses the relatively recent emergence of chemical
castration and the consequences associated with its use.
B. MALE STERILIZATION METHODS

Sterilization of males takes one of three forms: surgical castration, s4
vasectomy" and, more frequently in recent times, chemical castration.56
Contrary to the popular misconception that it entails amputation of the
penis, 57 surgical castration involves removal of the testosterone-producing
48. State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985). The three defendants in Brown pled
guilty hoping to receive lenient sentences because of their status as first offenders. The trial
judge, however, gave each defendant a thirty-year prison sentence, offering to suspend the
sentence and place them on probation provided they consent to castration. See Michael S.
Serrill, Castration or Incarceration?, TIME, Dec. 12, 1983, at 70.
49. Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 411.
50. Id. at 411-12.
51. Id. at 412. The court cited to Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (D. Iowa 1914) and
Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) in support of its position that castration
represented a type of mutilation. Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 412. See infra text accompanying
notes 157-167 discussing Eighth Amendment challenges to castration.
52. See Heim & Hursch, supra note 45, at 281-82.
53. See infra notes 63-71 for a discussion of the origin and administration of chemical
castration.
54. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (defining surgical castration).
55. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (defining vasectomy).
56. Chemical castration refers to the administration of hormone suppressers to block
testosterone production in male patients. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text
(discussing development and use of chemical castration).
57. See Sandra G. Boodman, Does Castration Stop Sex Crimes?: An Old Punishment
Gains New Attention, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at Z07.
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testicles.5 8 Surgical castration does not eliminate a man's ability to achieve
erection, but merely diminishes the sex drive by limiting the production of
59
An irreversible form of sterilization,
the male hormone, testosterone.
surgical castration also involves a number of side effects for the recently
castrated individual, including perspiration, loss of facial and body hair,
weight gain and softening of the skin.' By contrast, vasectomy, the other
tying of the
surgical, male sterilization procedure, requires the cutting and
62
6 and is a reversible form of male sterilization.
vas deferens
The newest form of male sterilization, chemical castration, does not
require surgery, but rather, involves treatment with hormone suppressers.
Chemical castration is accomplished through weekly injections with drugs
63 The drug most commonly used,
that inhibit testosterone production.
64
medroxyprogesterone acetate, a synthetic female hormone, saw wide65
spread use in Europe before infiltrating the United States market.
Originally marketed as a contraceptive called Depo-Provera, the drug has
proven most effective in the treatment of paraphiliacs, sex offenders
58. See supra note 26. At Denmark's Herstedvester Institute for Abnormal Criminals,
castration program involves extensive pre-surgery psychiatric examinations and
surgical
the
six months of aftercare group therapy. Sturup, Castration: The Total Treatment, in SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL ASPECTS 362, 376 (H. Resnik & M. Wolfgang
eds., 1972) (cited in Green, supra note 46, at 4).
59. See Boodman, supra note 57, at Z07. According to John Money, Emeritus
Professor of Medical Psychology and Pediatrics at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, the
most popular misconception about castration is that it renders men incapable of having sexual
intercourse. Id. However, because the penis is left intact and testosterone continues to be
produced in the adrenal glands, some castrated men may be capable of intercourse. Id.
60. See Green, supra note 46, at 4.
61. The vas deferens is the excretory duct of the testes, which joins with the excretory
duct of the seminal vesicle and forms the ejaculatory duct. THE SLOANE-DORLAND
ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 766 (1987).

62. See supra note 22. In 1899, an Indiana surgeon experimenting with the procedure
performed vasectomies on 176 reformatory inmates over an eight-year period. See Cynkar,
supra note 12, at 1433.
63. Boodman, supra note 57, at Z07.
64. Hereinafter referred to as "Depo-Provera."
65. Over ten million women in over eighty foreign countries have used Depo-Provera
as a contraceptive during the past fifteen years. See Malcolm Potts & John M. Paxman,
Depo-Provera: Ethical Issues in its Testing and Distribution, 1 J.MED. ETHICS 9 (1984)
(cited in Green, supra note 46, at n.24). When first introduced in the United States in 1959,
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved Depo-Provera for the treatment of
amenorrhea (lack of menstrual flow), irregular uterine bleeding and threatened miscarriage.
See Green, supra note 46, at n.23. However, in 1974 the FDA withdrew its approval for
Depo-Provera's use in these three treatments and as a female contraceptive upon the
discovery of a possible link between use of the drug and cancer. Id.
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motivated by uncontrollable, overwhelming sexual fantasies.'
Early
studies on the effectiveness of the drug indicated that Depo-Provera
injections curbed deviant conduct resulting from sexual arousal by decreasing the production of testosterone and thereby diminishing compulsive erotic
fantasies. 67 Recidivism rates for paraphiliacs subjected to chemical
castration rest just under five percent. 61 Physiological effects of DepoProvera include temporary diminution of erections and ejaculations and a
reduction of sperm count, in addition to side effects such as hypertension,
fatigue, weight gain, cold sweats, nightmares and muscle weakness.69
Studies indicate that within seven to ten days after the termination of
treatment, subjects regain full erective and ejaculatory abilities. ° To work
effectively in rehabilitating sex offenders, experts suggest that regular
counseling must accompany Depo-Provera treatment.71
The preceding analysis of foreign sterilization practices and United
States courts' responses to sterilization legislation indicates that castration
as an alternative to imprisonment may not achieve uniform acceptance by
American courts. Indeed, although some European nations continue to
statutorily regulate the castration of sex offenders, American courts have
traditionally expressed reluctance to uphold compulsory sterilization
legislation.72 Moreover, studies conducted on the effectiveness of surgical
and pharmacological castration suggest that the treatments have a limited
utility, proving ineffective in the treatment of rapists and other nonparaphiliacs motivated by anger.73 In addition, with the release of more
information concerning the negative side effects associated with the
66. Besharov & Vacchs, supra note 1, at 42. The treatment has proven less effective
with regard to non-paraphiliacs, those sex offenders motivated by intense anger and
hostility,
since the treatment fails to reach the cause of their harmful conduct. Id.
67. See Fred S. Berlin & Carl F. Meineke, Treatment of Sex Offenders
With

Anitandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment
Modalitites, and
PreliminaryFindings, 138 AM. J. PSYCIATRY 601, 603-05 (1981).

68. Id. One major problem with the research on chemical castration is that it focuses
almost exclusively on paraphiliacs and fails to provide data with respect to the
effects of
Depo-Provera treatment on non-paraphiliacs. See Green, supra note 46, at 7-8. While
some
evidence suggests non-paraphiliacs such as rapists may benefit from Depo-Provera
treatment,
most experts agree that reducing the rapist's sexual drive will only force him to exercise
his
deviance in another way. Id.
69. John T. Melella et al., Legal and Ethical Issues in the Use of Antiandrogens
in
Treating Sex Offenders, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 223, 225
(1989).
70. Id.
71. Boodman, supra note 57, at Z07.

72. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing judicial pattern
of
invalidating compulsory sterilization legislation).
73. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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treatments, including a risk of cancer from extended use of Depo-Provera,
courts may become increasingly hesitant to impose castration as a condition
of probation for convicted sex offenders.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STERILIZATION IN THE PUNITIVE
CONTEXT

The sterilization of individuals for punitive purposes raises a number
of constitutional issues. Government interference with an individual's
procreability to reproduce implicates constitutional rights to privacy and 74
To
ation and the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.
male
incarceration,
to
alternative
viable
achieve recognition as a legitimate,
sterilization must pass constitutional muster in each of the areas implicated.
Section A of the constitutional analysis examines castration's effects on
an individual's privacy rights. Specifically, this section demonstrates that
the practice of sterilization to punish sex offenders constitutes an unwarranted governmental intrusion violative of the right to privacy encompassed
within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section B
addresses the issue of castration within the context of procreative rights,
arguing that castration deprives an offender of his fundamental right to
procreate. In Section C, the offender's liberty interest in refusing the
unwanted medical treatment of castration is discussed. Finally, Section D
presents the Eighth Amendment objection to castration as punishment for
convicted sex offenders, concluding that all forms of castration fail to
qualify as treatment and constitute cruel and unusual punishment proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment.
A. CASTRATION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Although the Constitution contains no explicit mention of a privacy
right, the Supreme Court has acknowledged an implied right to privacy
under the Fourteenth Amendment protecting an individual's autonomy in
75 and contraception. 76
In
making decisions concerning childbearing
74. See Green, supra note 46, at 17. Cf Janet F. Ginzburg, Compulsory Contraception

as a Condition of Probation:

The Use and Abuse of Norplant. 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979

(1992) (discussing the constitutional issues raised by requiring convicted female child abusers
to undergo Norplant implantation as a condition of probation).
75. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1978) (recognizing that the
constitutional privacy protection enunciated in Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
extends to individual childbearing decisions).
76. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that privacy right
encompasses the fight of unmarried persons to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing fight of married couples to practice contraception as a
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Griswold v. Connecticut,77 the Court held that a state statute barring
married persons' use of contraceptives violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, reasoning that the penumbras of the Bill of Rights'
enumerated protections created a "zone of privacy. '78 The Court
in
Griswold characterized an individual's privacy interest as a fundamental
right upon which the state cannot intrude in the absence of a compelling
governmental interest. 79 The Supreme Court further articulated
the
protected realm of privacy in Eisenstadt v. Baird,'° concluding that to have
any meaning at all, the right of privacy must include the "right of any
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion" into his or her decision of whether or not to have children.8
Declining to limit the privacy right identified in Griswold to married
persons, the Court declared that the "marital couple is not an independent
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup."8 2
The
landmark case of Roe v. Wade8 3 provided a more complete definition of
the
right to privacy." In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas described
the
privacy right as encompassing freedom from bodily restraint and compulsion, the liberty in caring for one's own health and person and "freedom
of
choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce,
procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children."8
"
Although accorded fundamental status by the Supreme Court, the
privacy right is not absolute. A state may infringe upon an individual's
privacy right; however, any state action interfering with such a right
is
subjected to strict scrutiny analysis.8 6 Under this rigorous standard
of
review, the Court will only uphold the action where the state can demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and the use of means narrowly

constitutionally protected privacy interest).
77. 381 U.S. at 485.

78. Id.

79. Id. at 484-86.
80. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
81. Id. at 453.
82. Id. The Court thus extended the privacy right enunciated in Griswold
to unmarried
individuals by employing an equal protection analysis. Id. at 454-55.
83. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
84. Id. (Douglas, J., concurring) (opinion found in Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 209
(1973)).
85. Id. at 211. Justice Douglas considered such interests "customary, traditional,
and
time-honored rights, amenities, privileges, and immunities that come within
the sweep of 'the
Blessings of Liberty' mentioned in the preamble to the Constitution." Id.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).

NORTHERN IWLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

87
tailored to effectuate that interest. Applying this standard, the Eisenstadt
Court rejected the state's asserted goals of discouraging premarital sexual
activity and promoting marital fidelity, concluding that the legislation
88 Similarly,
exercised no deterrent effect on extramarital sexual activity.
in a concurring opinion in Griswold, Justice Goldberg found that the statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married persons swept unnecessarily broadly by "reaching far beyond the evil sought to be dealt with and
89
'
Within the context
intruding upon the privacy of all married couples."
interests in the
state
compelling
of abortion, the Court has recognized
However, as
viability."
at
protection of maternal health and potential life
discussed in the following section, the rationales asserted as justifications for
9
castration fail to qualify as compelling interests. '
An interference with an individual's ability to reproduce, whether permanent or temporary, clearly implicates the constitutional right of privacy. By
offering castration to convicted sex offenders as an alternative to imprisonment, legislatures and courts intrude upon an offender's decision whether or
not to have children, a decision the Court in Griswold deemed protected
from unwarranted governmental invasion under the Fourteenth Amendment.92 Just as a state may not prohibit married and single persons from
using contraception, 93 so it should not be allowed to compel individuals to
practice contraception.94 Proponents of the use of castration as a form of
punishment for sex offenders may argue that because the offender has the

87. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
88. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 n.3 (1972). The Court explained that under
the statutory provision in question, married persons could legally obtain contraceptives for
use in extramarital affairs, indicating that the legislation was not narrowly tailored to the
asserted purposes. Id.
89. 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J.,concurring). Justice Goldberg noted that
Connecticut had legislation prohibiting fornication and adultery, demonstrating that the state
possessed alternative means of preserving marital fidelity without intruding upon protected
freedoms. Id.
90. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973). "[Tjhe State does have an
important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant
woman .. .[and] in protecting the potentiality of human life. Each [interest] grows in
substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes
'compelling.'" Id.
91. See infra part 1.B (arguing that castration as an alternative to incarceration
interferes with an offender's fundamental right of procreation and fails a compelling interest
analysis).
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
93. Id. at 479; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
94. Cf.Ginzberg, supra note 74, at 980 (exploring compulsory contraception in the
context of convicted female child abusers).
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opportunity to reject sterilization and choose incarceration instead, no
intrusion of protected privacy rights occurs. 95 However, the inherently
coercive nature of the choice between freedom through castration and an
extended prison sentence renders voluntary consent to sterilization an
impossibility. 96 The privacy right primarily implicated by castration in the
punitive context is the fundamental right of procreation, a privacy interest
meriting a separate discussion that includes analysis under the strict scrutiny
standard.
B. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PROCREATION

The Supreme Court has declared that an individual's right to procreate
represents "one of the basic civil rights of man. '97 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 98 the Court held that a state statute providing for the sterilization of
habitual criminals violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by discriminating against a certain class of offenders."
Although the Skinner Court decided the issue on the basis of the Equal
Protection Clause,"°° in reaching its conclusion, the Court found marriage
and procreation to be "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
[human] race."' 0 ' In its holding, the Skinner Court announced its intention
to strictly scrutinize any classification made within a state's sterilization

95. See, e.g., Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of
the
Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 44 (1990) (arguing that an offender suffers
no
deprivation of privacy rights where he retains his ability to choose chemical castration).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 204-11 (arguing that the alternative threat
of
a long prison term prevents a convicted offender from acting freely in electing
castration).
97. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
98. Id.
99. Id. The petitioner, convicted of stealing chickens in 1926 and of robbery with
firearms in 1929 and 1934, faced sterilization by vasectomy pursuant to OKLA. STAT.
ANN.
tit. 57, § 171 (West 1935). Id. at 537. In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson
cautioned
that "[there are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may
conduct
biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural
powers of
a minority--even those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes."
Id. at
546 (Jackson, J., concurring).
100. The Oklahoma statute at issue in Skinner mandated sterilization for persons
convicted more than once of felonies involving moral turpitude, but excluded violations
of
prohibitory laws, revenue acts and the offenses of embezzlement and political crimes
from
the provisions of the act. Id. at 536-37. The Court concluded that since the
nature of
embezzlement and larceny is intrinsically the same, by imposing sterilization as a penalty
for
one and not the other, the state made a discrimination as "invidious ... as if it had
selected
a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." id. at 539, 541.
101. Id. at 541.

NORTHERN IWLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

I[Vol. 15

laws."° The Court apparently found such an elevated level of review to
be warranted since the penalty of sterilization had both "farreaching and
devastating effects, which, if placed "in evil or reckless hands ... [could]
cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear." °3 In a subsequent decision, the Court reiterated its recognition
of procreation as a fundamental interest meriting constitutional privacy
protection. "°
Since the Supreme Court has expressly labeled the right of procreation
a fundamental right,10 a state may only regulate personal procreative
1°6 Under
decisions upon a showing of a compelling governmental interest.
the compelling interest standard of review, the government must not only
demonstrate a compelling objective, but must further employ the least
07
restrictive means to achieve that objective.
Castration as an alternative to incarceration, whether surgical or chemical, violates the right of procreative freedom. To render a convicted sex
offender sterile is to deprive him of his right to procreate, a right characterized by Justice Douglas in Skinner as "one of the basic civil rights of
man.' '8 Castration, like a vasectomy, eliminates the offender's capacity
for procreation.' 9 However, castration by surgery or injections represents
a more intrusive procedure than the vasectomy at issue in Skinner because
0
Furthermore, while
it results in the cessation of the sexual drive."
with an
interference
temporary
a
only
chemical castration involves
treatment,
of
period
the
individual's ability to reproduce, nevertheless, for
the individual's procreative freedom is denied."'
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul, the Court acknowledged that
areas including marital and family matters, procreation, contraception and child-rearing and
education encompass fundamental interests entitled to privacy protection. Id. at 713.
105. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also Paul, 424 U.S. at
713.
106. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved,. . regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state
interest.'" Id.
107. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
108. 316 U.S. at 541.
109. See Green. supra note 46, at 24.
110. Id.
111. Offenders subjected to chemical castration may face prolonged treatment periods
since erective and ejaculatory capabilities are restored within seven to ten days upon the
termination of injections. See Melella, supra note 69, at 225. Thus, to be effective, the
treatment must be administered continuously, perhaps indefinitely, for some offenders, and
may therefore result in a prolonged or perhaps permanent deprivation of the offender's
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Castration as punishment for sex offenders also fails the compelling
interest test. First, state officials would most likely assert the interest of
public safety as a justification for establishing castration as an alternative to
prison for convicted sex offenders." 2 Additionally, some may argue that
society has a compelling interest in rehabilitating sex offenders." 3
However, each of these possible rationales fails to constitute a compelling
governmental interest sufficient to outweigh an offender's privacy right.
Castration merely eliminates the sex offender's ability to achieve an
erection; it does not eradicate the violence motivating the criminal acts." 4
Moreover, because chemical castration is only effective during the actual
period of treatment, to achieve the objective of public safety, the treatment
may have to be continued indefinitely."'
The second prong of the compelling interest test requires that the state
use the least intrusive means to achieve its purpose." 6 An offer of
probation which provides for castration intrudes upon a probationer's
privacy right because less intrusive sanctioning alternatives exist." 7
Incarceration arguably protects members of the public more than castration
because it removes the offender from society. By contrast, chemical and
surgical castration allow the offender greater access to potential victims
without eliminating the hostility and rage causing the violent conduct.
procreative freedom.
112. See Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974) (suggesting safety
may represent a valid justification for compelled treatment). See also Linda S. Demsky,
The
Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 295,
305-06

(1984) (identifying potential state interests justifying forced medical treatment as the

preservation of life, public safety, the prevention of suicide and maintenance of the
ethical
integrity of the medical profession).
113. See Demsky, supra note 112, at 307 (suggesting that because it is generally
accepted that prisons fail at rehabilitation, an alternative such as castration may
seem
especially attractive).
114. See Green, supra note 46, at 13 (arguing that the emotions of hatred and fear
that
motivate a rapist have little to do with sexual drive).
115. See Demsky, supra note 112, at 306. The practical effect of ongoing DepoProvera treatment is to multiply the procedure's intrusiveness and to expose the offender
to
serious health risks. Id. See also infra note 118 & accompanying text (discussing
the
dangers associated with Depo-Provera treatment).
116. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
117. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(invalidating condition of probation prohibiting woman convicted of child endangerment
from
conceiving because less intrusive alternatives existed). See also Green, supra note 46,
at 25.
Imprisonment and psychotherapy represent less intrusive alternatives to surgical castration.
Id. Proponents of chemical castration argue that Depo-Provera injections are less
intrusive
since they only temporarily reduce an offender's ability to procreate and do not
produce
complete impotence. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 9.
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Moreover, castration subjects an offender to immediate adverse physiological
8
effects, and in the case of chemical castration, future health risks." Since
imprisonment would not expose the convicted offender to such risks, it
arguably constitutes a less intrusive alternative to sterilization. Consequently, the use of castration as a sanction for sex offenders would most likely
fail the strict scrutiny test. Any form of male sterilization in a punitive
context therefore represents an unjustified invasion of an offender's
fundamental right of procreation.
C. RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT

In addition to procreative rights, compulsory castration also implicates
an offender's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. The Supreme
Court has recognized that an individual possesses a liberty interest which
includes the right to withhold consent to intrusive medical treatment.'
However, the Court cautioned that the acknowledgment of a liberty interest
forms only the first part of the inquiry; the second part of the analysis20
state interests.
requires balancing the liberty interest against the relevant
In Cruzan, the Court ultimately determined that the state's interest in the
preservation of human life justified the imposition of the heightened evidtreatment.' 2'
entiary requirement for the termination of life-sustaining
When balancing the governmental interests against the individual's liberty
interest in refusing treatment, courts have identified four state interests
potentially outweighing an indiviudal's liberty interest: the protection of
life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties and
118. See Green, supra note 46, at 14-15. In studies conducted with animals, DepoProvera caused some forms of cancer. Physiological side effects of Depo-Provera include
hypertension, weight gain, cold sweats and fatigue. See Melella, supra note 69, at 225.
119. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In its discussion of the
rights of parents of a comatose patient to refuse artificial hydration and nutrition on their
daughter's behalf, the Court declined to ground the patient's interest in the constitutional
privacy right, choosing instead to label it a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. Id. at 279
n.7. The majority upheld Missouri's clear and convincing standard of proof and concluded
that the Cruzans had failed to present clear and convincing evidence of their daughter's
desire to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 284-85. The dissenting Justices would have
recognized a fundamental right to refuse artificial hydration and nutrition which may not be
denied simply because of the patient's incompetence. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 279. Accord Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993)
(balancing the right to be free from non-consensual intrusions into bodily integrity against
countervailing state interests of preservation of life, prevention of suicide, integrity of
medical profession and protection of innocent third parties).
121. 497 U.S. at 282-83. See also In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (permitting the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in the presence of clear and
convincing evidence that formerly competent patient would have refused treatment).

1994:1071

CASTRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION

the preservation of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'2 2
Courts have expressly recognized the right of competent patients
involuntarily committed to state mental institutions to refuse the administration of intrusive treatment. 23 These cases suggest that a convicted sex
offender retains, as part of his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, the
right to refuse the medical treatment of surgical castration, vasectomy or
chemical castration. Since the sterilization procedures involve side effects,
and, in the case of chemical castration, unknown long-term consequences,
an offender has the right to decide whether to accept such risks by
consenting to the treatment." In this context, the government may assert
the interest of protecting innocent third parties by removing an offender's
ability to commit future sex crimes. However, this interest may be
effectuated by incarceration, and does not require such a highly intrusive
measure of forcing an offender to surrender his procreative freedom. Courts
have found
unjustified violations of prisoners' constitutional liberty
interests when medical procedures were performed without the prisoners'
consent. 25 For example, in Runnels v. Rosendale,26 the court found
that a hemorroidectomy performed over a prisoner's objections violated the
prisoner's constitutional rights. 27 Unlike the procedure, at issue in
Runnels, castration results in the deprivation of an offender's fundamental
right of procreation and presents immediate and long-term health risks. 28
Castration thus represents an even more intrusive practice than the treatment
administered in Runnels and would qualify as an unjustified interference
with an individual liberty interest if imposed upon sex offenders. Proponents of castration as an alternative to incarceration would seek to distinguish the practice by emphasizing that the offender may choose to submit
to the procedure. 29 However, as discussed further within the context of
122. See 855 P.2d at 383; Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358, 364 (Wash. 1988). See also
Demsky, supra note 112, at 305.
123. See, e.g., Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)
(concluding that competent patient could not be compelled to undergo electroshock therapy);
In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751 (Okla. 1980) (holding that legally competent patient has
right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs).
124. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 17. In rejecting chemical castration as a valid
condition of probation, one court noted the drug's experimental nature and the "alphabet of
adverse reactions" resulting from use of Depo-Provera. People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d
310, 315-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
125. See, e.g., Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 735.
128. See supra note 118 describing health risks linked to use of Depo-Provera.
129. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 21.
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informed consent, the choice itself remains inherently coercive and therefore
The foregoing discussion indicates that the
not entirely voluntary.'
unwanted medical treatment extends to
refuse
constitutional right to
convicted sex offenders and safeguards their freedom to reject castration as
a punitive measure.
D. CASTRATION AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Another objection to male sterilization as an alternative to incarceration
may be premised on the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
provided by the Eighth Amendment. 131 An Eighth Amendment analysis
of castration as punishment for convicted sex offenders requires an
examination of two issues: first, whether the procedure is considered
second, whether the procedure constitutes cruel
punishment or treatment, and
32
punishment.
unusual
and
In determining whether a given procedure serves as treatment or
133
The court
punishment, one federal court has developed a four-part test.
in Rennie v. Klein' examined the following factors before concluding
that the forced administration of a psychotropic drug to inmates in a state
hospital constituted treatment outside the scope of the Eighth Amendment:
(1) whether the procedure has any therapeutic value, (2) whether its use is
regarded as accepted medical practice or experimental, (3) whether the
procedure is part of a continuing psychotherapeutic program, and (4)
35
of its benefits.
whether its adverse effects are unduly harsh in light
Although surgical and chemical castration may arguably have some
therapeutic value when administered in conjunction with ongoing psychological counseling, each procedure fails to qualify as treatment under the Rennie
analysis. Some studies suggest that surgical castration, in combination with
psychiatric therapy, provided long-term benefits without subjecting the
36
offender to unduly harsh physiological or psychological effects.'
130. See infra notes 190-211 and accompanying text (analyzing the doctrine of informed
consent as it relates to castration as an alternative to imprisonment).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. (emphasis added).
132. See Green, supra note 46, at 20.
133. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978).
134. 462 F. Supp. 1131.
135. Id. at 1143. Applying the four-part analysis to the administration of the
psychotropic drug, prolixin, the court in Rennie determined that prolixin had been proven
effective and recognized as "an integral component of an overall treatment program," and
further, that "[w]hile the side effects of prolixin are serious, they are not unnecessarily harsh
in light of its potential benefits." Id.
136. See Sturup, supra note 58, at 375.
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Similarly, research indicates that Depo-Provera injections may have some
therapeutic value, relieving the paraphiliac offender of his uncontrollable
sexual urge. 3 7 However, the castration of sex offenders fails the remaining prongs of the Rennie test. United States courts have generally rejected

the imposition of surgical sterilization as punishment.

3

Chemical

castration has likewise failed to achieve status as a medically accepted treatment. t39 Although some proponents of Depo-Provera argue that the
procedure should be considered an innovative therapy rather than an
experimental drug," 4 at least one court has rejected this position.' 4' The
court in People v.Gauntlett 42 determined that the chemical castration
imposed upon the defendant "fails as a lawful condition of probation
because it has not gained acceptance in the medical community as a safe
and reliable medical procedure." 43 The Gauntlett decision therefore
indicates that courts may find chemical castration an experimental procedure

constituting punishment rather than treatment.

Finally, the adverse side effects associated with surgical and chemical
castration outweigh any potential benefits of the procedures. Surgical
castration entails physical mutilation in addition to side effects following
surgery.'44
Chemical castration presents immediate adverse physical
effects 145 and serious long-term health risks."M Research findings on the
137. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 33. However, because Depo-Provera is only

effective during the period of injections, once the injections cease, the paraphiliac's

uncontrollable sexual urges will most likely return. See supra text accompanying note 70.
138. See, e.g., Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds,
242 U.S. 468 (19.17); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918). Both courts held that
statutes providing for vasectomies to be performed on habitual criminals violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
139. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Depo-Provera's long-term
health risks which present a major obstacle to the drug's acceptance as a viable treatment).
140. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 34.
141. See People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). The defendant
was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced by the Kalamazoo
Circuit Court to five years probation during which time he would undergo treatment with
Depo-Provera. Id. at 311-12.
142. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310.
143. Id. at 316. The court found the treatment to be experimental, noting that the
medical-psychiatric research on the topic was limited. Id. More recently, an Idaho Court of
Appeals rejected treatment with Depo-Provera for a convicted pedophile after concluding that
the drug provided no guarantee of success in rehabilitating the offender because the
treatment's intended effects could be counteracted with other drugs. State v. Estes, 821 P.2d
1008, 1009-10 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
144. See supra note '60 and accompanying text (describing the adverse side effects of
surgical castration).
145. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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effectiveness of castration in rehabilitating sex offenders remain inconclusive."' Moreover, chemical castration provides no long-term benefits to
the offender. Once the treatment ceases, the offender may revert to his
former conduct. 4 8 Additionally, with both surgical and chemical castra-

tion, the reduction of testosterone production will not remove the anger and

4 9 Castration
hostility motivating the offender's acts of sexual violence.'
in any form fails to qualify as treatment under the Rennie test and must
therefore be examined as punishment.
While the Eighth Amendment may have been originally intended to
protect against punishment deemed inhuman and barbarous, the Supreme
5
Court has construed the provision more broadly. ' In Weems v. United
States, 5' for example, the Court focused on the disproportionality between
the penalty and offense to determine whether the defendant's sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.' 52 Not merely a static concept,
the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
153
Despite its
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'
seeming ;'eluctance to explicitly define the limits of the provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, the Court has established some guidelines for
determining Eighth Amendment violations. The Court has incorporated

146. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
147. Green, supra note 46, at 7. None of the castration research findings have been
based on controlled group studies with long-term follow-up. Id. (citing to Pacht, The Rapist
in Treatment: Professional Myths and Psychological Realities, in SEXUAL ASSAULT 90 (M.
Walker & S. Broadsky eds., 1976)).
148. Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 34.
149. See supra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text.
150. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910). The Court expressly
rejected the notion that the Eighth Amendment applied to only inhuman and barbarous
punishments. Id.
151. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
152. id. at 366-67. The defendant, convicted of falsification of an official document
by a public official, was sentenced to imprisonment at hard and painful labor for fifteen years
during which time he would wear a chain at the ankle, suffer deprivation of his civil rights
and be subject to lifetime surveillance. In declaring such punishment cruel and unusual, the
Court noted that penalties like the defendant received "amaze those who have formed their
conception of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of the
American commonwealths and believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense." Id.
153. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The Court interpreted the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment as preventing the government from imposing

denationalization upon a United States Army wartime deserter. Reasoning that denaturaliza-

tion completely destroys an individual's status in society and therefore renders the individual
"stateless," the Court found that such a "threat [of statelessness] makes the punishment
obnoxious." Id. at 101-02.
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three interrelated tests to identify cruel and unusual punishment: (1)
whether the punishment is inherently cruel; (2) whether the punishment
is disproportionate to the offense; 55 and (3) whether the punishment
exceeds the extent necessary to achieve the legitimate governmental objectives. 116
Under the first test, a court focuses on the inherent cruelty of the
punishment. 57 Some lower courts have extended the cruelty of the
sterilization procedure to encompass more than its immediate physical
effects. 5" In Davis v. Berry, 159 an Iowa Federal District Court held a
state statute requiring vasectomies for all criminals convicted twice of a
felony unconstitutional on the basis of the cruel and unusual punishment
provision.W In its decision, the court emphasized the humiliation inflicted
upon the defendant as a factor deserving consideration in determining the
cruelty of a particular punishment.16 ' Applying this same rationale, a
Nevada District Court issued an order enjoining the sterilization by
vasectomy of a convicted rapist. 62 In Mickle v. Henrichs,163 the court
reasoned that "while vasectomy in itself is not cruel ... when resorted to
as punishment, it is ignominious and degrading, and in that sense is
cruel.""6
Most recently, the Supreme Court of South Carolina voided the suspended sentence of a sex offender where the suspension and probation were
conditioned on the offender's submission to surgical castration. 65 According to the court in State v. Brown,' 66 because castration constitutes
154. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1879); in re Kimmler, 136 U.S. 436,

446-47 (1890).

155. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 366-67.

156. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972).
157. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-102.

158. See Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S.
468 (1917); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D.C. Nev. 1918).
159. 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
160. Id. One year after the defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court, the
Iowa legislature repealed the challenged statute. See Berry v. Davis, 242 U.S. 468, 470
(1917).
161. 216 F. at 416. "[The castration or vasectomy] is... to follow the man during the
balance of his life. The physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not the only test
of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the mental suffering are always present
..... Id.
162. Mickle, 262 F. at 687.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 690.
165. State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985).

166. Id.
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physical mutilation, it satisfies the cruelty requirement of the prohibition
67
against cruel and unusual punishment.' While the Brown decision seems
to focus on the physical suffering associated with castration, "mutilation" as
used by the court also suggests an element of degradation, consistent with
earlier courts' analysis of cruelty.
Both surgical and chemical castration involve mutilation and humiliation found to be inherently cruel by some courts. Both procedures impair
an offender's ability to procreate and may produce or intensify feelings of
inadequacy and shame. However, unlike surgical castrations performed
during the early part of the century, the non-surgical Depo-Provera treatment
does not entail severe physical pain.'" Yet Depo-Provera may ultimately
result in permanent sterilization because it must be administered continuously to be effective, therefore producing the same effect as surgical
castration.169
The second test focuses on the disproportionality between the penalty
and the offense.7 0 Under the Weems' standard, where a punishment
is greatly disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed, that
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. Given that a prison sentence,
a punishment which does not require physical mutilation, represents the
alternative to castration, sterilization would appear to violate this second test.
An irreversible procedure, surgical castration entails adverse physiological
effects and mutilation.7 Similarly, chemical castration involves immediate negative effects as well as serious future health risks, and through its
'
continued administration, may become a permanent deprivation of
procreative freedom.!7 3 An extended term of imprisonment, a punishment
traditionally imposed upon convicted sex offenders and considered
proportionate to the offense, does not subject a convicted sex offender to

167. Id. at 412.

168. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71 (explaining the development, use and
effects of chemical castration).
169. See supra note 111. Research also indicates that sterilization by vasectomy no
longer carries a severe social stigma, primarily because of the frequency with which men and
women choose sterilization as a method of birth control. Data suggests that approximately
one million Americans elect sterilization each year. Colleen M. Coyle, Sterilization: A
"Remedy for the Malady" of Child Abuse?, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245, 257
n.95 (1989) (citing statistics from CURRENT OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS &
TREATMENT 827 (M. Pernoll & R. Benson eds., 1987)).
170. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
171. Id.
172. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 111 (explaining the necessity of continuous administration of DepoProvera).

1994:107]

CASTRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO INCARCERATION

these same risks, nor does it require physical mutilation. Given that
punishment by a term of incarceration represents a generally accepted
penalty for sex offenders, an alternative punishment entailing physical
mutilation or exposure to serious health risks would seem to be disproportionate to the offense and therefore violative of the test articulated in Weems.
Courts applying the third test examine whether a given punishment
exceeds the extent necessary to achieve the state's legitimate punitive
objectives. 74 Under this test, castration violates the provision against
cruel and unusual punishment because less intrusive alternatives exist. A
prison sentence is less invasive because it does not involve physical
mutilation or harmful side effects, nor does it require the offender to
permanently surrender his procreative liberty. Furthermore, castration has
not been proven effective in accomplishing the aim of rehabilitating nonparaphiliac offenders.7 7 Either form of castration would thus fail the third
test used to determine cruel and unusual punishment.
The preceding analysis of constitutional objections to castration demonstrates that sex offenders possess the fundamental right to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into their decision-making concerning
procreation. Because castration is not the least restrictive means available
to effectuate the governmental interest of protecting society, sterilization as
a punitive measure violates offenders' Fourteenth Amendment privacy
rights. Additionally, offenders enjoy a constitutionally protected liberty
interest to refuse unwanted medical treatment in the form of surgical or
pharmacological castration, or vasectomy. Finally, castration implicates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Failing to qualify as treatment, when subjected to scrutiny under any of the
established tests, castration would most likely be found to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.
IV. REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TEST FOR TERMS OF PROBATION

Proponents of castration as a punitive measure seek its implementation
as a term of probation for convicted sex offenders.' 76 However, before a
sentencing judge imposes castration as part of a convicted offender's
probation, the procedure must first achieve recognition as a valid probationary condition.'
Determinations of the validity of probationary condi-

174.
175.
176.
at 42.
177.

See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 57-58; Besharov & Vacchs, supra note 1,
See Ginzberg supra note 74, at 987-88 (discussing the validity of probationary
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tions reflect an underlying concern for rehabilitating the offender. Although
courts maintain great discretion in imposing terms of probation for convicted
criminals,' all probation conditions, in addition to overcoming constitutional challenges, must meet the requirements of the reasonable relationship
test. 7 9 This standard requires that probationary conditions bear a reasonable relationship to the crime for which the offender was convicted, to the
rehabilitation of the offender in order to prevent future criminality, or to the
promotion of public safety."s° Additionally, the condition must be
unnecessarily
narrowly drawn to accomplish rehabilitation "without
'181
activities."
lawful
otherwise
probationer's
the
restricting
As a condition of probation, a judge may order an offender to receive
medical and psychiatric treatment.' 82 Proponents of the use of castration
characterize the procedure as an innovative medical treatment and urge
8 3 However, before
courts to order castration as a term of probation.
imposing such treatment as a probationary condition, a court must deem the
treatment reasonably related to both the crime for which the offender has
been convicted and to his future criminality.'8 Castration as an alterna-

conditions in the context of Norplant).
178. See Green, supra note 46, at 12. "Aside from ... minimal requirements for the
defendant's eligibility and the conditions and terms of his probation, statutes provide virtually
no guidance for judges. As a consequence, trial court judges and juries have broad discretion
to determine what conditions best suit the needs of the convicted offender." Id.
179. See United States v. Stine, 521 F. Supp. 808, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding
reasonable relationship test satisfied by condition of probation requiring convicted felon to
submit to psychiatric counseling); see also GEORGE G. KILLINGER ET AL., PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 72 (1976).
180. See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980); State v.
Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
181. 627 F.2d at 898 (emphasis added). See also People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357,
365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding term of probation prohibiting conception by woman
convicted of child endangerment held overbroad and invalid); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d
918, 919-920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding condition of probation prohibiting convicted
child abuser from fathering child held invalid because of interference with noncriminal
conduct).
182. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18:2-3(b)
(1980).
183. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 58 (describing chemical castration as a "legitimate
medical treatment").
184. In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 883 n.4 (1971) (citing to People v. Dominguez,
64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)). In Dominguez, the court determined that a
probationary condition prohibiting pregnancy outside of marriage was not reasonably related
to both the robbery for which the defendant was convicted and to future criminality. 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 293. Courts adopting the Dominguez test have recognized the following conditions
of probation as satisfying the reasonable relationship standard: People v. Patillo, 6 Cal. Rptr.
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tive to incarceration fails both parts of this test with regard to non-paraphiliacs. First, because the non-paraphiliac's conduct is motivated by anger and
hatred rather than sexual drive, treatments that merely curb his sexual drive
bear no reasonable relationship to the offender's criminal behavior. 5
Second, castration does not necessarily prevent future criminality because
the treatment merely eliminates one channel of violence towards victims and
may not reduce an offender's urge to attack women or children.'8 6 Indeed,
the procedure may actually generate additional violence, since non-paraphiliac offenders are motivated not by sexual drive, but by intense feelings of
hatred and hostility. 87 Finally, castration as a punitive measure has the
effect of unnecessarily interfering with the offender's participation in lawful
activities. Indeed, sterilization renders an offender incapable of engaging in
sexual intercourse, depriving him of his privacy and more specifically, his
procreative rights.188 Thus, Depo-Provera treatment bears an insufficient
2d 456, 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring convicted cocaine dealer to participate in AIDS
education program); People v. Shimek, 252 Cal. Rptr. 214, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(imposing drug testing on convicted marijuana cultivator); Smith v. State, 513 So. 2d 1367,
1369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (requiring drug user to abstain from consuming alcohol).
By contrast, courts have invalidated the following probationary conditions: Simpson v. State,
772 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring convicted felon to obtain probation
officer's permission before changing his marital status); Brodus v. State, 449 So. 2d 941, 942
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (prohibiting drug user from living with an unrelated female);
Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (prohibiting convicted child
abuser from marrying or becoming pregnant).
185. See Green, supra note 46, at 13 (emphasizing that a rapist's feelings of fear and
hatred have little to do with sexual drive).
186. ld. According to rape crisis counselors, violence, not sex, is the real issue in sex
offenses. Castration, by itself, does not eliminate the violence, rather, it forces an offender
to manifest that violence by a means other than sex. Boodman, supra note 57, at Z07.
187. See Besharov & Vachhs, supra note 1, at 43. Andrew Vachhs, a juvenile justice
advocate and acclaimed crime novelist, argues that castration may intensify the hostility of
an offender forced to "stew in the bile" of what he perceives his victims have done to him.
Id. at 43.
188. See Green, supra note 46, at 13. Proponents of castration for convicted sex
offenders argue that imprisonment produces a similar effect; however, for incarcerated
individuals, the right to privacy and procreation technically survives. See Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (characterizing the right of procreation as "a basic civil
right" that is "fundamental to the very survival of the race" while invalidating a statute that
provided for automatic sterilization of offenders with three felony convictions). See also
Cromwell v. Coughlin, 773 F. Supp. 606, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that incarcerated
individuals possess a fundamental right to marital relations). The Supreme Court has
permitted prison administrators to restrict the exercise of such rights, determining that
administrators have wide discretion to impose regulations for the safe and efficient operation
of the institutions. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974).
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relationship to the sex offense and, because of its temporary nature, does
nothing to guard against future criminality. While proponents assert that
counseling in combination with the drug therapy reasonably relates to the
sex offense and future criminality, the treatment would necessarily require

long-term use in order to be effective.

9

V. INFORMED CONSENT OBJECTION TO CASTRATION

As a term of probation, castration cannot be forced upon an offender
against his will. An offender retains the right to refuse probation.'9g
Should an offender choose to submit to castration as a probationary
condition, he must provide informed consent to the procedure.' 9' The
192
doctrine of informed consent articulated in Canterbury v. Spence
requires that an individual be told all relevant information regarding
treatment, including all possible risks, in order to allow him to make an
informed decision on whether or not to consent to the proposed treatment.' 9a The underlying premise of the doctrine of informed consent is
the preservation of individual autonomy, or the right of "every human being
of adult years and sound mind ... to determine what shall be done with his

[or her] own body."' 94
Different standards have been employed to define the requirements of
informed consent. The majority of jurisdictions use the professional
standard, focusing on the type and extent of information a reasonable
physician would divulge to a patient under the same or similar circumstances.' 95 The standard adopted by a minority of jurisdictions, the reasonable

189. Green, supra note 46, at 14. In Germany, a sex offender who avoided a life
sentence by consenting to castration acquired access to hormones and later strangled a seven
year old girl, demonstrating that the temporary reduction of the sexual drive fails to remove
the danger to society. See Besharov & Vachhs, supra note 1, at 43.
190. See, e.g., State v. Carmickle, 762 P.2d 290, 297 (Or. 1988); People v. Osslo, 323
P.2d 397, 413 (Cal. 1958); Cannon v. State, 624 So. 2d 238, 240 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
Cf.State v. Kinney, 350 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Neb. 1984).
191. See Green, supra note 46, at 15. Surgical castration, as a medical procedure,
implicates the doctrine of informed consent. Id. Because Depo-Provera is an experimental
drug which some view as a form of medical treatment, chemical castration would similarly
require voluntary and informed consent by the offender. Id.
192. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). In Canterbury, a
surgeon failed to tell his patient that the back surgery he was about to perform could result
in spinal cord injury. During the operation, the patient's spinal cord sustained injury and the
patient was rendered permanently paralyzed. Id. at 778.
193. Id. at 780.
194. Id. at 778.
195. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
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patient standard, focuses on the information required by a reasonable patient
in order to make an informed decision regarding treatment.' 96 Under this
standard, physicians have a duty to disclose all material risks of a procedure
to the patient. 97 The Canterbury court defined "material" risks as those
"the physician knows or should know . . .[a reasonable person] would be
likely to attach significance to ... in deciding whether or not to forego the
proposed therapy."' 98 The court proceeded to identify four factors a
physician is obligated to discuss with the patient: the known risks, the
anticipated benefits, the likely consequences without treatment and the
alternatives to the proposed procedure." 9
Applying the four factors to castration as a form of punishment for sex
offenders, the doctrine of informed consent would dictate that the offender
be warned of all side effects and risks attendant upon use of surgical or
chemical castration. Thus, an offender given the option of Depo-Provera
must be informed of all ill effects of the drug, including hypertension,
fatigue, cold sweats and muscle weakness, in addition to the more serious
risk of cancer.' ° Similarly, the offender facing surgical castration must
be apprised of the irreversibility of the procedure and the physical effects of
the operation.20'
Expected benefits for castrated paraphiliac offenders include relief from
uncontrollable sexual urges and the ability to return to the community.
However, for non-paraphiliac offenders, castration does not alleviate the
anger and hostility within the offender manifesting itself in acts of violence
against women and children.0 2 Without the sterilization procedure, a
(1974); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965). See also Lori B. Andrews, Informed
Consent Statutes and the Decisioninaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163, 176-77 (1984).
This standard relies on expert testimony in order to determine the adequacy of a particular
physician's disclosure. Id.
196. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I (Cal. 1972). See also Andrews, supra note 195,
at 176-77. Like the District of Columbia Circuit Court in Canterbury v. Spence, the court
in Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d at 5, employed the reasonable patient standard where a surgeon
failed to apprise his patient about to undergo ulcer surgery of the potential risk of injury to
the patient's spleen. Id.
197. See Andrews, supra note 195, at 176-77.
198. 464 F.2d at 787.
199. Id. at 787-89.
200. See Melella, supra note 69, at 225.
201. Surgically castrated individuals experience a postoperative period of sweating, loss
of body and facial hair, weight gain and softening 'of the skin. See Sturup, supra note 58,
at 381.
202. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. Quite the contrary, at least one expert
suggests that castration may. actually intensify the offender's anger by reinforcing his
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convicted offender faces removal from society through a period of
incarceration. Although imprisonment without counseling may not eliminate
the disorder causing the criminal conduct, it does eliminate the risk to
society posed by the offender's presence in the public. Most importantly,
in the absence of conclusive research demonstrating the material risks and
benefits of surgical and chemical castration, an offender faced with the
alternative of sterilization cannot give informed consent to the procedures. °3
Castration presents problems with regard to informed consent when
evaluating the voluntariness of an offender's consent. Although the
convicted offender may choose to either submit to castration and receive
probation or accept a typically long prison sentence, the choice may not be
entirely voluntary. To be involuntary, consent does not have to result from
threats of personal violence; threats render consent involuntary when they
prevent an individual from acting freely. 2" Coercion is established by
demonstrating that duress induced individuals
to give their consent where
205
they would not otherwise have done so.
Courts have found consent coerced where convicted offenders and
inmates of prisons and mental institutions accepted psychosurgery or
psychotropic drugs as a condition of probation, parole or release. 20 6 For
instance, in Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, °7 the court held
that a mental patient could not give voluntary consent to experimental

distorted perception of himself as a victim. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203. Green, supra note 46, at 15-16. Nearly all studies on the effectiveness of surgical
and chemical castration focus exclusively on paraphiliac offenders. Id. at 15. Proponents
maintain, however, that the informed consent doctrine requires only that all known risks be
presented to the individual. See Fitzgerald, supra note 95, at 20.
204. Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 154 A.2d 625, 629 (N.J. 1959).
205. See Corey H. Marco & Joni Michel Marco, Antabuse: Medication in Exchange
for a Limited Freedom--Is it Legal?, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 311 (1980). The authors
maintain that offering participation in an Antabuse program to a defendant convicted of an
intoxication-related crime as an alternative to jail constitutes coercion rendering subsequent
consent to the treatment involuntary. Id. at 311-12.
206. Wolonsky v. Babson, 387 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (recognizing
institutionalized setting as inherently coercive such that mental patient could not voluntarily
accept psychoactive treatment as condition of release); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
(D.N.J. 1978) (emphasizing inherently coercive nature of institutional setting where mental
patient was compelled to ingest psychotropic drugs); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), summarized
at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973) (concluding that the nature of incarceration diminishes
prisoners' capacity to give voluntary consent to behavior modification experiments).
207. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973),
summarized at 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973).
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surgery where the patient's release might depend upon submission to
psychosurgery."'
In reaching its conclusion, the court cautioned that
"there must be close scrutiny of the adequacy of the consent when an
experiment... is dangerous, intensive, irreversible, and of uncertain benefit
to the patient and society." 2°9
Applying the Kaimowitz analysis, courts would most likely find
castration as an alternative to prison inherently coercive. As potentially
dangerous procedures with uncertain benefits to the offender and society,
courts should subject consent to surgical or chemical castration to close
scrutiny. When viewed from the offender's perspective, the choice between
incarceration and castration appears inherently coercive; to select castration
is to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. 210 Faced with a long term of
imprisonment, offenders may readily consent to invasions of their bodily
integrity. Proponents argue, however, that the difficulty of a choice does
not necessarily remove the voluntariness of consent. 1 Still, to offer an
offender deprivation of his liberty with incarceration or deprivation of his
fundamental right to procreate with sterilization is to offer him no choice at
all. Invariably, an offender will surrender his procreative rights to preserve
his liberty rather than surrender his freedom. Castration as an alternative to
a prison sentence therefore violates the voluntariness requirement of the
informed consent doctrine.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to its constitutional and common law implications,
castration raises several significant policy considerations. Most important
to a determination of its viability as an alternative to incarceration is its
effectiveness as a punitive measure. According to recent studies, approximately forty percent of rapists and pedophiles will repeat their crimes.1 2
A primary criticism of castration as a form of punishment for sex offenders
is that it fails to address the anger and hatred motivating sex offenses
against women and children. 2 3 To take away an offender's ability to
208. Id., slip op. at 27. See also Note, Kainowitz v. Department of Mental Health: A
Right to be Free From Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U. L. REV. 301, 315-16 (1974).
209. Id., slip op. at 20.
210. See Green, supra note 46, at 16.
211. Fred S. Berlin, Ethical Uses of Antiandrogenic Medications, 138 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY

1516 (1981).

212. Boodman, supra note 57, at Z07 (discussing research cited by Judith Becker,
Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the University of Arizona College of Medicine).
213. Id. According to Denise Snyder, Executive Director of the D.C. Rape Crisis
Center, castration "misfocuses the issue and feeds into the myths about rape. Sexual assault

138
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4
While
procreate is merely to eliminate one channel of aggression."
as
rate
recidivism
percent
advocates of chemical castration hail its five
evidence of the program's success, that statistic may be misleading. A high
percentage of sex crimes go unreported, and further, most treatment
programs track participants' progress for only a short time after the
5
termination of treatment, when the risk of relapse is the lowest."
Critics also attack castration as a sanctioning alternative for its seeming
lenience.216 Instead of serving thirty years in prison, a convicted sex
offender may elect to undergo surgical castration, vasectomy, or chemical
castration and retain his freedom." 7 Victims of serious sex offenses
would most likely not be reassured knowing that the violent offender who
injured them will escape incarceration upon completion of a sterilization
procedure. Moreover, castration merely validates the offender's distorted
218 The source
self-portrait, that he is a victim who cannot help himself.
of the violence, the uncontrollable anger and hostility, will remain long after
the scalpel or injection removes the offender's capability to procreate.
Finally, the cost to society of practicing compulsory castration may also
undermine its viability. Admittedly, the state would incur minimal expense
in surgically castrating sex offenders in relation to the money spent keeping
those same offenders in prison.21 9 However, castrated offenders may very
well vent their aggression in other criminal ways and therefore ultimately
require incarceration.22 ° Similarly, those offenders undergoing chemical
castration and counseling present a financial burden. 221 Not only must the

is a crime of violence and aggression ... not the product of an uncontrollable sex drive." Id.
214. See Besharov & Vachhs, supra note I, at 43. According to juvenile justice
advocate and crime novelist Andrew Vachhs, the perception that a castrated sex offender
"ceases to be a danger ... is nonsense--the motivation for sexual assault will not disappear
with the severed genitalia or altered hormones." Id. at 43.
215. Boodman, supra note 57, at Z07 (reporting information from Steven H. Jensen, a
Portland, Oregon therapist and past president of the Association for the Behavioral Treatment
of Sex Offenders).
216. Besharov & Vachhs, supra note 1, at 44.
217. A defendant convicted of criminal sexual conduct in State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d
410 (S.C. 1985) was given the choice of a thirty year prison sentence or surgical castration.
218. Besharov & Vachhs, supra note I, at 43.
219. A recent study by the Medical Journal of Australia lists the cost of surgical
castration as approximately $2,689. Jill Margo, Australia: Needle or Knife, He's Still
Impotent --Man Trouble," SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 19, 1994, at 13. According to
the most recent statistics, it costs $25,000 per year to house a single inmate. Federal Judges
Oppose Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 24 CORRECTIONS DIGEST 6, 7 (1993).
220. See supra notes 186, 189 (discussing sexual offenders' manifestation of violence
through other channels).
221. Although Depo-Provera is theoretically available, most offenders lack access to the
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state cover the cost of the drug for those offenders unable to pay for their
own treatment, 222 but financial resources must also be used to provide
counseling services. 22 A counseling staff must be funded in order to treat
and monitor the progress of chemically castrated offenders. Such a program
requires a great deal of both time and money to operate effectively. Viewed
in terms of the above social and economic considerations, sterilization does
not appear to be a viable alternative to incarceration.
VII. CONCLUSION

Castration should be rejected as an unacceptable, ineffective and
unconstitutional alternative to imprisonment. A lingering spectre from the
American eugenics movement at the turn of the century, the sterilization of
criminals has enjoyed limited legislative and judicial support in contemporary society.
However, relatively recent technological developments
resulting in the marketing of hormone suppressers has added a new
dimension to the issue of sterilization of sex offenders and has received
support for its non-surgical method of temporarily reducing the sexual drives
of paraphiliac offenders. Despite the procedural differences, however,
chemical castration and its surgical equivalents share constitutional flaws
which render them inappropriate substitutes for incarceration.
The prevailing forms of male sterilization interfere with an offender's
ability to produce offspring, and, as a consequence, violate the offender's
constitutionally protected privacy rights, including the fundamental right of
procreation. Moreover, the offender maintains a liberty interest in exercising
his right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. A state is therefore
precluded from forcing an offender to undergo sterilization unless it
demonstrates a legitimate interest overriding the offender's right of selfdetermination. Subjected to Eighth Amendment analysis, castration in any
form fails to qualify as treatment and instead constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
In addition to its constitutional flaws, castration as punishment for sex
offenders cannot withstand scrutiny under the informed consent doctrine and
the reasonable relationship test for terms of probation. Because castration
treatment. Green, supra note 46, at 13-14. The cost of Depo-Provera injections over a twoyear period have been estimated at more than $16,000; however, the counseling services
typically accompanying the injections makes the actual cost of chemical castration
significantly higher. See Margo, supra note 219, at 13.
222. One commentator suggests that almost all convicted rapists lack the financial
resources to pay for chemical castration. Id. at 14.
223. See Boodman, supra note 57, at Z07. Experts claim that Depo-Provera works most
effectively when administered in conjunction with other forms of therapy. Id.
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merely removes one channel of aggression and fails to address the hatred
and anger motivating the majority of sex offenders, it is not reasonably
related to the offense or future criminality by the same offender. Moreover,
the doctrine of informed consent requires a knowledgeable and voluntary
decision to undergo treatment, yet offering a convicted offender castration
as an alternative to a lengthy prison sentence constitutes an inherently
coercive practice rendering truly voluntary consent impossible. Thus,
castration should be rejected as a condition of probation.
Finally, policy considerations mandate the elimination of punitive
sterilization practices for sex offenders. The seemingly low recidivism rate
hailed by proponents as evidence of chemical castration's success fails to
reflect the high number of sex crimes that go unreported each year.
Proponents additionally ignore the substantial administrative costs associated
with implementing a treatment program of chemical castration for criminals
who cannot pay for it themselves and who may likely have to continue
treatment for long periods of time. Not only does this procedure drain
valuable public resources, but at the same time, it subjects the offenders to
potentially dangerous side effects, the full extent of which remains unknown.
In a society besieged by crime and the fear it begets, where prison
overcrowding has grown to massive proportions and society is desperate for
a cure, castration may seem to be the definitive remedy. Nevertheless, a
remedy which necessitates the deprivation of fundamental rights and
personal liberties and which fails to address the source of the problem must
be rejected as an unacceptable solution.
KARI A. VANDERZYL

